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Common Knowledge in Email Exchanges
Floor Sietsma∗ and Krzysztof R. Apt∗
Abstract
We consider a framework in which a group of agents communicates
by means of emails, with the possibility of replies, forwards and blind
carbon copies (BCC). We study the epistemic consequences of such
email exchanges by introducing an appropriate epistemic language and
semantics. This allows us to find out what agents learn from the emails
they receive and to determine when a group of agents acquires common
knowledge of the fact that an email was sent. We also show that in our
framework from the epistemic point of view the BCC feature of emails
cannot be simulated using messages without BCC recipients.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Email is by now a prevalent form of communication. From the point of view
of distributed programming it looks superficially as an instance of multi-
casting —one agent sends a message to a group of agents. However, such
features as forwarding and the blind carbon copy (BCC) make it a more
complex form of communication.
The reason is that each email implicitly carries epistemic information
concerning (among others) common knowledge of the group involved in it
of the fact that it was sent. As a result forwarding leads to nested common
knowledge and typically involves at each level different groups of agents. In
turn, the BCC feature results in different information gain by the regular
recipients and the BCC recipients. In fact, in Section 7 we show that the
BCC feature is new from the epistemic point of view.
To be more specific, suppose that an agent i forwards a message m
to a group G. Then the group G ∪ {i} acquires (among others) common
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knowledge of the fact that the group A consisting of the sender and the
receivers of m has common knowledge of m. Next, suppose that an agent
i sends a message m to a group G with a BCC to a group B. Then the
group G ∪ {i} acquires common knowledge of m, while each member of B
separately acquires with the sender of m common knowledge of the fact that
the group G ∪ {i} acquires common knowledge of m.
Combining forward and BCC we can realize epistemic formulas CA1 ...CAkm,
where CA stands for ‘the group A has common knowledge of’, of arbitrary
depth. Further, this combination can lead to a(n undesired) situation in
which a BCC recipient of an email reveals his status to others by using the
reply-all feature. In general, a chain of forwards of arbitrary length can re-
veal to a group of agents that an agent was a BCC recipient of the original
email. We conclude that the email exchanges, as studied here, are essentially
different from multicasting.
Epistemic consequences of email exchanges are occasionally raised by
researchers in various contexts. For instance, the author of [2] mentions
‘some issues of email ethics’ by discussing a case of an email discussion in
which some researchers were not included (and hence could not build upon
the reported results).
Then consider the following recent quotation from a blog in which the
writers call for a boycott of a journal XYZ: “We are doing our best to
make the misconduct of the Editors-in-Chief a matter of common knowledge
within the [...] community in the hope that everyone will consider whatever
actions may be appropriate for them to adopt in any future associations
with XYZ”.
So when studying email exchanges a natural question arises: what are
their knowledge-theoretic consequences? To put it more informally: after an
email exchange took place, who knows what? Motivated by the above blog
entry we can also ask: can sending emails to more and more new recipients
ever create common knowledge? (Our Main Theorem shows that the answer
is “No.”)
To be more specific consider the following example to which we shall
return later.
Example 1. Assume the following email exchange involving four people,
Alma, Bob, Clare and Daniel:
• Alma and Daniel got an email from Clare,
• Alma forwarded it to Bob,
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• Bob forwarded Alma’s email to Clare and Daniel with a BCC to Alma,
• Alma forwarded the last email to Clare and Daniel with a BCC to
Bob.
It is natural to ask for example what Alma has actually learned from Bob’s
email. Also, do all four people involved in this exchange have common
knowledge of the original email by Clare?
To answer such questions we study email exchanges focusing on relevant
features that we encounter in most email systems. More specifically, we
study the following form of email communication:
• each email has a sender, a non-empty set of regular recipients and
a (possibly empty) set of blind carbon copy (BCC) recipients. Each
recipient receives a copy of the message and is only aware of the regular
recipients and not of the BCC recipients (except himself),
• in the case of a reply to or a forward of a message, the unaltered
original message is included,
• in a reply or a forward, one can append new information to the original
message one replies to or forwards.
To formalize agents’ knowledge resulting from an email exchange we in-
troduce an appropriate epistemic language and the corresponding semantics.
The resulting model of email communication differs from the ones that were
studied in other papers in which only limited aspects of emails have been
considered. These papers are discussed below. In our setup the communica-
tion is synchronous. While this is a simplification we find that it is natural
to clarify email communication in such a setting first before considering var-
ious alternatives. In the last section we address this point further when
suggesting further research.
1.2 Contributions and plan of the paper
To study the relevant features of email communication we introduce in the
next section a carefully chosen language describing emails. We make a dis-
tinction between a message, which is sent to a public recipient list, and an
email, which consists of a message and a set of BCC recipients. This distinc-
tion is relevant because a forward email contains an earlier message, without
the list of BCC recipients. We also introduce the notion of a legal state that
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imposes a natural restriction on the considered sets of emails by stipulat-
ing an ordering of the emails. For example, an email needs to precede any
forward of it.
To reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange has
taken place we introduce in Section 3 an appropriate epistemic language. Its
semantics takes into account the uncertainty of the recipients of an email
about its set of BCC recipients. This semantics allows us to evaluate epis-
temic formulas in legal states, in particular the formulas that characterize
the full knowledge-theoretic effect of an email.
Apart from factual information each email also carries epistemic infor-
mation. In Section 4 we characterize the latter. It allows us to clarify which
groups of agents acquire common knowledge as a result of an email and what
is the resulting information gain for each agent.
In Section 5 we present the main result of the paper, that clarifies when
a group of agents can acquire common knowledge of the formula expressing
the fact that an email has been sent. This characterization in particular
sheds light on the epistemic consequences of BCC. The proof is given in
Section 6.
Then in Section 7 we show that in our framework BCC cannot be sim-
ulated using messages without BCC recipients. Finally, in Section 8 we
provide a characterization of legal states in terms of properly terminating
email exchanges.
1.3 Related work
The study of the epistemic effects of communication in distributed systems
originated in the eighties and led to the seminal book [6]. The relevant
literature, including [5], deals with the communication forms studied within
the context of distributed computing, notably asynchronous send.
One of the main issues studied in these frameworks has been the analysis
of the conditions that are necessary for acquiring common knowledge. In
particular, [7] showed that common knowledge cannot be attained in the
systems in which the message delivery is not guaranteed. More recently this
problem was investigated in [3] for synchronous systems with known bounds
on message transmission in which processes share a global clock. The au-
thors extended the causality relation of [8] between messages in distributed
systems to synchronous systems with known bounds on message transmis-
sion and proved that in such systems a so-called pivotal event is needed in
order to obtain common knowledge. This in particular generalizes the previ-
ous result of [5] concerning acquisition of common knowledge in distributed
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systems with synchronous communication.
The epistemic effects of other forms of communication were studied in
numerous papers. In particular, in [12] the communicative acts are assumed
to consist of an agent j ‘reading’ an arbitrary propositional formula from
another agent i. The idea of an epistemic content of an email is implic-
itly present in [14], where a formal model is proposed that formalizes how
communication changes the knowledge of a recipient of the message.
In [4] a dynamic epistemic logic modelling effects of communication and
change is introduced and extensively studied. Further, in [19] an epistemic
logic was proposed to reason about information flow w.r.t. underlying com-
munication channels. [11] surveys these and related approaches and dis-
cusses the used epistemic, dynamic epistemic and doxastic logics.
Most related to the work here reported are the following two references.
[1] studied knowledge and common knowledge in a set up in which the agents
send and forward propositional formulas in a social network. However, the
forward did not include the original message and the BCC feature was ab-
sent. More recently, in [17] explicit messages are introduced in a dynamic
epistemic logic to analyze a similar setting, though BCC was simulated as
discussed in Section 7. In both papers it is assumed that the number of
messages is finite. In contrast, in the setting of this paper the forward in-
cludes the original message, which results directly in an infinite number of
messages and emails. Finally, let us mention that the concept of forwarding
is occasionally mentioned in the context of distributed computing, see, e.g.,
[9].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Messages
In this section we define the notion of a message. In the next section we
introduce emails as a simple extension of the messages. We assume a non-
empty and finite set of agents Ag = {1, ..., n} and a set of notes. Each
note is an abstraction of the contents of the message or an email.
We make a number of assumptions. Firstly, we assume that initially each
agent i has a set of notes Li he knows. He does know which notes belong to
the other agents and does not know the overall set of notes. Furthermore,
we assume that the agents only exchange messages about the notes. We also
assume that an agent can send a message to other agents containing a note
only if he holds it initially or has learnt it through a message he received
earlier.
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This minimal set up precludes the possibility that the agents can use
messages to implement some agreed in advance protocol, such as that send-
ing two specific notes by an agent would reveal that he has some specific
knowledge. It allows us to focus instead on the epistemic information caused
directly by the structure of the messages and emails.
Of course in reality emails may contain propositional or epistemic infor-
mation which affects knowledge of the agents at a deeper level than modelled
here by means of abstract notes. To reason about notes containing such in-
formation one could add on the top of our framework an appropriate logic.
If every note n contains some formula ϕn, then one could just add the im-
plications n → ϕn to this logic to ensure that every agent who knows the
note n also knows the formula ϕn.
We inductively define messages as follows, where we assume that G 6=
∅:
• m := s(i, l, G); the message containing note l, sent by agent i to the
group G,
• m := f(i, l.m′, G); the forwarding by agent i of the message m′ with
added note l, sent to the group G.
So the agents can send a message with a note or forward a message with
a new note appended, where the latter covers the possibility of a reply or a
reply-all. Appending such a new note to a forwarded message is a natural
feature present in most email systems. To allow for the possibility of sending
a forward without appending a new note, we can assume there exists a note
true that is held by all agents and identify true.m with m.
If m is a message, then we denote by S(m) and R(m), respectively, the
singleton set consisting of the agent sending m and the group of agents
receiving m. So for the above messages m we have S(m) = {i} and R(m) =
G. We do allow that S(m) ⊆ R(m), i.e., that one sends a message to oneself.
Special forms of the forward messages can be used to model reply mes-
sages. Given f(i, l.m,G) with i ∈ R(m), using G = S(m) we obtain the
customary reply message and using G = S(m) ∪ R(m) we obtain the cus-
tomary reply-all message. (In the customary email systems there is syntactic
difference between a forward and a reply to these two groups of agents, but
the effect of both messages is exactly the same, so we ignore this difference.)
In the examples we write s(i, l, j) instead of s(i, l, {j}), etc.
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2.2 Emails
An interesting feature of most email systems is that of the blind carbon copy
(BCC). We study here the epistemic effects of sending an email with BCC
recipients and will now include this feature in our presentation.
In the previous subsection we defined messages that have a sender and a
group of recipients. Now we define the notion of an email which allows the
additional possibility of sending a BCC of a message. The BCC recipients
are not listed in the list of recipients, therefore we have not included them
in the definition of a message. Formally, by an email we mean a construct
of the form mB, wherem is a message and B ⊆ Ag is a possibly empty set of
BCC recipients. Given a message m we call each email mB a full version
of m.
An email mB is delivered to the regular recipients, i.e., to the set R(m)
and to the set B of the BCC recipients. Each of them receives the message
m. Only the sender of mB , i.e., agent i, where S(m) = {i}, knows the set
B. Each agent i ∈ B only knows that the set B contains at least him.
Since the set of the BCC recipients is ‘secret’, it does not appear in a
forward. That is, the forward of an email mB with added note l is the
message f(i, l.m,G) or an email f(i, l.m,G)C , in which B is not mentioned.
This is consistent with the way BCC is handled in most email systems, such
as gmail or email systems based on the postfix mail server. However, this
forward may be sent not only by a sender or a regular recipient of mB, but
also by a BCC recipient. Clearly, the fact that an agent was a BCC recipient
of an email is revealed at the moment he forwards the message.
A natural question arises: what if someone is both a regular recipient
and a BCC recipient of an email? In this case, no one (not even this BCC
recipient himself) would ever notice that this recipient was also a BCC
recipient since everyone can explain his knowledge of the message by the fact
that he was a regular recipient. Only the sender of the message would know
that this agent was also a BCC recipient. This fact does not change anything
and hence we assume that for every emailmB we have (S(m)∪R(m))∩B = ∅.
Example 2. Using the just introduced language we can formalize the story
from Example 1 as follows, where we abbreviate Alma to a, etc.:
• Alma and Daniel got an email from Clare:
e0 := m∅, where m := s(c, l, {a, d}),
• Alma forwarded it to Bob:
e1 := m
′
∅, where m
′ := f(a,m, b),
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• Bob forwarded Alma’s email to Clare and Daniel with a BCC to Alma:
e2 := m
′′
{a}, where m
′′ := f(b,m′, {c, d}),
• Alma forwarded the last email to Clare and Daniel with a BCC to
Bob:
e3 := f(a,m
′′, {c, d}){b} .
2.3 Legal states
Our goal is to analyze knowledge of agents after some email exchange took
place. To this end we need to define a possible collection of sent emails.
First of all, we shall assume that every message is used only once. In
other words, for each message m there is at most one full version of m,
i.e., an email of the form mB. The rationale behind this decision is that
a sender of mB and mB′ might equally well send a single email mB∪B′ .
This assumption can be summarized as a statement that the agents do not
have ‘second thoughts’ about the recipients of their emails. It also simplifies
subsequent considerations.
In this work we have decided not to impose a total ordering on the emails
in our model, for example by giving each email a time stamp. This makes
the model a lot simpler. Also, many interesting questions can be answered
without imposing such a total ordering. For example, we can investigate the
existence of common knowledge in a group of agents after an email exchange
perfectly well without knowing the exact order of the emails that were sent.
However, we have to impose some ordering on the sets of emails. For
example, we need to make sure that the agents only send information they
actually know. Moreover, a forward can only be sent after the original email
was sent. We will introduce the minimal partial ordering that takes care of
such issues.
First, we define by structural induction the factual information FI(m)
contained in a message m as follows:
FI(s(i, l, G)) := {l},
F I(f(i, l.m,G)) := FI(m) ∪ {l}.
Informally, the factual information is the set of notes which occur somewhere
in the message, including those occurring in forwarded messages.
We will use the concept of a state to model the effect of an email ex-
change. A state s = (E,  L) is a tuple consisting of a finite set E of emails
that were sent and a sequence  L = (L1, ..., Ln) of sets of notes for all agents.
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The idea of these sets is that each agent i initially holds the notes in Li.
We use Es and  Ls to denote the corresponding elements of a state s, and
L1, ..., Ln to denote the elements of  L.
We say that a state s = (E,  L) is legal if a strict partial ordering (in
short, an spo) ≺ on E exists that satisfies the following conditions:
L.1: for each email f(i, l.m,G)B ∈ E an email mC ∈ E exists such that
mC ≺ f(i, l.m,G)B and i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪ C,
L.2: for each email s(i, l, G)B ∈ E, where l 6∈ Li, an email mC ∈ E exists
such that mC ≺ s(i, l, G)B , i ∈ R(m) ∪C and l ∈ FI(m),
L.3: for each email f(i, l.m′, G)B ∈ E, where l 6∈ Li, an email mC ∈ E exists
such that mC ≺ f(i, l.m
′, G)B , i ∈ R(m) ∪ C and l ∈ FI(m).
Condition L.1 states that the agents can only forward messages they
previously received. Conditions L.2 and L.3 state that if an agent sends or
forwards a note that he did not initially hold, then he must have learnt it
by means of an earlier email.
So a state is legal if its emails can be partially ordered in such a way that
every forward is preceded by its original message, and for every note sent
in an email there is an explanation how the sender of the email learnt this
note. As every partial ordering can be extended to a linear ordering, the
emails of a legal state can be ordered in such a way that each agent has a
linear ordering on its emails. However, such a linear ordering does not need
to be unique. For example, the emails s(i, l, j)∅ and s(i, l, k)∅ can always be
ordered in both ways.
Moreover, a strict partial ordering that ensures that a state is legal
does not need to be unique either and incompatible minimal partial or-
derings can exist. Here is an example provided by one of the referees. Sup-
pose that l ∈ Li \ Lj and j ∈ G1 ∩ G2, and consider the set of messages
{s(i, l, G1), s(i, l, G2), s(j, l, k)}. The resulting state (we identify here each
message m with the email m∅) is legal. There are two minimal spos that can
be used to establish this, s(i, l, G1) ≺ s(j, l, k) and s(i, l, G2) ≺ s(j, l, k). So
we cannot conclude that any specific message sent by agent i has to precede
the message sent by agent j, though we have to assume that at least one of
them does.
This shows that the causal relation between emails essentially differs
from the causal relation between messages in distributed systems, as studied
in [8]. Further, the assumption that communication is synchronous does not
result in a unique spo on the considered emails.
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3 Epistemic language and its semantics
We want to reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange
has taken place. For this purpose we use a language L of communication
and knowledge defined as follows:
ϕ ::= m | i ◭ m | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | CGϕ
Here m denotes a message. The formula m expresses the fact that m has
been sent in the past, with some unknown group of BCC recipients. The
formula i ◭ m expresses the fact that agent i was involved in a full version of
the message m, i.e., he was either the sender, a recipient or a BCC recipient.
The formula CGϕ denotes common knowledge of the formula ϕ in the group
G.
We use the usual abbreviations ∨,→ and↔ and use Kiϕ as an abbrevi-
ation of C{i}ϕ. The fact that an email with a certain set of BCC recipients
was sent can be expressed in our language by the following abbreviation:
mB ::= m ∧
∧
i∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B
i ◭ m ∧
∧
i 6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B
¬i ◭ m
This formula expresses the fact that the messagem was sent with exactly the
group B as BCC recipients, which captures precisely the intended meaning
of mB . The BCC recipients are distinguished from the regular recipients
in R(m) by the fact that for any agent i in S(m) and R(m), the fact that
i ◭ m holds follows from the fact that m holds. On the other hand, for the
agents in B, the fact that i ◭ m holds follows from mB and not from m
alone.
We now provide a semantics for this language interpreted on legal states,
inspired by the epistemic logic and the history-based approaches of [12] and
[14]. For every agent i we define an indistinguishability relation ∼i, where
we intend s ∼i s′ to mean that agent i cannot distinguish between the states
s and s′. We first define this relation on the level of emails as follows (recall
that we assume that senders and regular recipients are not BCC recipients):
mB ∼i m
′
B′
iff one of the following contingencies holds:
(i) i ∈ S(m), m = m′ and B = B′,
(ii) i ∈ R(m) \ S(m) and m = m′,
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(iii) i ∈ B ∩B′, and m = m′.
Condition (i) states that the sender of an email confuses it only with the
email itself. In turn, condition (ii) states that each regular recipient of an
email who is not a sender confuses it with any email with the same message
but possibly sent to a different BCC group. Finally, condition (iii) states
that each BCC recipient of an email confuses it with any email with the
same message but sent to a possibly different BCC group of which he is also
a member.
Example 3. Consider the emails e := s(i, l, j)∅ and e
′ := s(i, l, j){k}. We
have then e 6∼i e
′, e ∼j e
′ and e 6∼k e
′. Intuitively, agent j cannot distin-
guish between these two emails because he cannot see whether k is a BCC
recipient. In contrast, agents i and k can distinguish between these two
emails.
Next, we extend the indistinguishability relation to legal states by defin-
ing
(E,  L) ∼i (E
′,  L′)
iff all of the following hold:
• Li = L
′
i,
• for every mB ∈ E such that i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B there is mB′ ∈ E
′
such that mB ∼i mB′ ,
• for every mB′ ∈ E
′ such that i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B there is mB ∈ E
such that mB ∼i mB′ .
So two states cannot be distinguished by an agent if they agree on his
notes and their email sets look the same to him. Since we assume that the
agents do not know anything about the other notes, we do not refer to the
sets of notes of the other agents. Note that ∼i is an equivalence relation.
Example 4. Consider the legal states s1 and s2 which are identical apart
from their sets of emails:
Es1 := {s(i, l, j)∅, f(j, s(i, l, j), o)∅},
Es2 := {s(i, l, j){k}, f(j, s(i, l, j), o)∅ , f(k, s(i, l, j), o)∅}.
We assume here that l ∈ Li and that in each state the emails are ordered
by the textual ordering. So in the first state agent i sends a message with
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note l to agent j and then j forwards this message to agent o. Further, in
the second state agent i sends the same message but with a BCC to agent
k, and then both agent j and agent k forward the message to agent o.
From the above definition it follows that s1 6∼i s2, s1 ∼j s2, s1 6∼k s2
and s1 6∼o s2. For example, the first claim holds because, as noticed above,
s(i, l, j)∅ 6∼i s(i, l, j){k}. Intuitively, in state s1 agent i is aware that he sent a
BCC to nobody, while in state s2 he is aware that he sent a BCC to agent k.
In turn, in both states s1 and s2 agent j is aware that he received the message
s(i, l, j) and that he forwarded the email f(j, s(i, l, j), o)∅ . Intuitively, in
state s2 agent j does not notice the BCC of the message s(i, l, j) and is not
aware of the email f(k, s(i, l, j), o)∅.
In order to express common knowledge, we define for a group of agents
G the relation ∼G as the reflexive, transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G ∼i. Then we
define the truth of a formula from our language in a state inductively as
follows, where s = (E,  L):
s |= m iff ∃B : mB ∈ E
s |= i ◭ m iff ∃B : mB ∈ E and i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B
s |= ¬ϕ iff s 6|= ϕ
s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s |= ϕ and s |= ψ
s |= CGϕ iff s
′ |= ϕ for every legal state s′ such that s ∼G s
′
We say that ϕ is valid (and often just write ‘ϕ’ instead of ‘ϕ is valid’)
if for all legal states s, s |= ϕ.
Even though this definition does not specify the form of communication,
one can deduce from the definition of the relation ∼ that the communication
is synchronous, that is, that each email is simultaneously received by all the
recipients. We shall discuss this matter in more detail in Section 8. Note
also that the condition of the form mB ∈ E present in the second clause
implies that for every email mB the following equivalence is valid for all
i, j ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B:
i ◭ m↔ j ◭ m.
This means that in every legal state (E,  L) either all recipients of the email
mB received it (when mB ∈ E) or none (when mB 6∈ E).
The limited form of the introduced language implies that the agents
cannot simulate a common ‘clock’ using which they could deduce how many
messages have been sent. Also, there is no common ‘blackboard’ using
which they could deduce how many messages have been sent by other agents
between two consecutive messages they have received. Further, the agents
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do not have a local ‘clock’ using which they could count how many messages
they sent or received.
The following lemma clarifies when specific formulas are valid. In the
sequel we shall use these observations implicitly. Below we use the relation
is part of on messages, defined inductively as follows:
• m is part f(i, l.m,G),
• if m′ is part of m, then m′ is part f(i, l.m,G).
Lemma 1.
(i) m→ m′ is valid iff m = m′ or m′ is part of the message m.
(ii) m→ i ◭ m′ is valid iff i ∈ S(m′)∪R(m′) or for some note l and group
G, f(i, l.m′, G) is part of the message m.
The second item states that m → i ◭ m′ is valid either if i is a sender
or a receiver of m′ (in that case actually i ◭ m′ is valid) or i forwarded the
message m′. The latter is also possible if i was a BCC receiver of m′. The
claimed equivalence holds thanks to condition L.1.
Example 5. To illustrate the definition of truth let us return to Example 4.
In state s2 agent j does not know that agent k received the message s(i, l, j)
since he cannot distinguish s2 from the state s1 in which agent k did not
receive this message. So s2 |= ¬Kjk ◭ s(i, l, j) holds.
On the other hand, in every legal state s3 such that s2 ∼o s3 both an
email f(k, s(i, l, j), o)C and a ‘justifying’ email s(i, l, j)B have to exist such
that s(i, p, j)B ≺ f(k, s(i, l, j), o)C and k ∈ B, where ≺ is an spo such
that the emails of s3 satisfy conditions L.1-L.3 w.r.t. ≺. Consequently
s3 |= k ◭ s(i, l, j), so s2 |= Kok ◭ s(i, l, j) holds, so by sending the forward
agent k revealed himself to o as a BCC recipient.
We leave to the reader checking that both s2 |= C{k,o}k ◭ s(i, l, j) and
s2 |= ¬C{j,o}k ◭ s(i, l, j) holds. In words, agents k and o have common
knowledge that agent k was involved in a full version of the message s(i, l, j),
while the agents j and o don’t.
4 Epistemic contents of emails
In Subsection 2.3 we defined the factual information contained in a message.
Using the epistemic language introduced in the previous section we can
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define the epistemic information contained in a message or an email.
First, we define it for messages as follows:
EI(s(i, l, G)) := C{i}∪Gs(i, l, G),
EI(f(i, l.m,G)) := C{i}∪G(f(i, l.m,G) ∧ EI(m)).
So the epistemic information contained in a message is the statement
that the sender and receivers acquire common knowledge of the fact that
the message was sent. In the case of a forward the epistemic information
contained in the original message also becomes common knowledge. This
results in nested common knowledge. In general, iterated forwards can lead
to arbitary nestings of the common knowledge operator, each time involving
a different group of agents.
The definition of the epistemic information contained in an email addi-
tionally needs to capture the information about the agents who are on the
BCC list of an email. We define:
EI(mB) := EI(m) ∧
∧
i∈B
CS(m)∪{i}(EI(m) ∧ i ◭ m) ∧ CS(m)mB.
So EI(mB) states that
• the epistemic information contained in the message m holds,
• the sender of the message and each separate agent on the BCC list
have common knowledge of this epistemic information and of the fact
that this agent received the message,
• the sender knows the precise set of BCC recipients.
The following result clarifies the nature of the epistemic information
contained in a message or an email.
Theorem 6. The following equivalences are valid:
(i) m↔ EI(m),
(ii) mB ↔ EI(mB).
Proof. Each relation ∼j on the level of states is an equivalence relation, so
for all formulas ϕ and G ⊆ Ag, the implication CGϕ → ϕ, and hence in
particular EI(m)→ m and EI(mB)→ mB , is valid.
(i) To prove the validity of m → EI(m) take a message m. Let A =
S(m) ∪ R(m). Consider an arbitrary legal state s and assume that s |= m.
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Suppose s ∼A s
′ for some legal state s′. Then there is a path s = s0 ∼i1
s1 ∼i2 . . . ∼il sl = s
′ from s to s′, where i1, . . . , il ∈ A and l ≥ 0.
For every k ∈ {1, . . . , l} suppose sk = (Ek,  Lk). Then for every k ∈
{1, . . . , l}, sk−1 |= m implies that for some B, mB ∈ Ek−1. Now, since
ik ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m), by the clauses (i) and (ii) of the definition of the ∼ik
relation on the emails for some group B′ we have mB′ ∈ Ek, which implies
sk |= m. Since s |= m, an inductive argument shows that s
′ |= m. This
proves that s |= CAm. So we established the validity of the implication
m→ CAm,
and in particular of s(i, l, G)→ EI(s(i, l, G)).
For the forward messages we proceed by induction on the structure of the
messages. Consider the message f(i, l.m,G). The implication f(i, l.m,G)→
m is valid, so by the induction hypothesis the implication f(i, l.m,G) →
EI(m) is valid. Since we showed already that the implication f(i, l.m,G)→
C{i}∪Gf(i, l.m,G) is valid, we conclude that the implication f(i, l.m,G) →
C{i}∪G(f(i, l.m,G) ∧ EI(m)) is also valid.
(ii) We already established the validity of m → EI(m). Then by the
definition of mB the implication mB → EI(m) is also valid.
Let i ∈ B. Consider an arbitrary legal state s and assume that s |= mB .
Suppose s ∼S(m)∪{i} s
′ for some legal state s′. Then there is a path s =
s0 ∼i1 s1 ∼i2 . . . ∼il sl = s
′ from s to s′, where i1, . . . , il ∈ S(m) ∪ {i} and
l ≥ 0.
For every k ∈ {1, . . . , l} suppose sk = (Ek,  Lk). Then for every k ∈
{1, . . . , l}, sk−1 |= mB implies that mB ∈ Ek−1 and then by the definition
of ∼k, mB′ ∈ Ek for some B
′ such that i ∈ B′. This means that sk |= i ◭ m
and sk |= m which implies by (i) sk |= EI(m). Since s |= mB an inductive
argument then shows that s′ |= EI(m) ∧ i ◭ m. So s |= CS(m)∪{i}(EI(m) ∧
i ◭ m).
Finally, suppose that s ∼j s
′, where S(m) = {j}, and s |= mB. By the
definition of the ∼j relation on the level of states mB ∈ Es′ so s
′ |= mB .
This proves s |= CS(m)mB.
We conclude that the implication mB → EI(mB) is valid. Trivially,
EI(mB)→ mB is also valid.
Using the above theorem we can determine ‘who knows what’ after an
email exchange E (taken from a legal state (E,L)) took place. The problem
boils down to computing
∧
e∈E EI(e). When we are interested in a specific
fact, for example whether after an email exchange E took place agent i
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knows a formula ψ, we simply need to establish the validity of the implication∧
e∈E EI(e)→ Ciψ.
Using the epistemic information contained in an email we can define the
information gain of an agent resulting from sending or receiving of an
email as follows. Suppose i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B. Then
IG(mB , i) :=


EI(mB) if S(m) = {i}
EI(m) if i ∈ R(m)
CS(m)∪{i}(EI(m) ∧ i ◭ m) if i ∈ B
We have then the following immediate consequence of Theorem 6.
Corollary 1. Take a legal state s = (E,  L) and an email mB ∈ E. Then
for every agent i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B,
s |= KiIG(mB , i).
Example 7. Using the notion of an information gain we can answer the
first question posed in Example 1, namely what Alma learned from Bob’s
email. First recall the notation introduced at the end of Subsection 2.2:
m := s(c, l, {a, d}),
e1 := m
′
∅, where m
′ := f(a,m, b), and
e2 := m
′′
{a}, m
′′ := f(b,m′, {c, d}).
By definition
EI(m) = C{a,c,d}m,
EI(m′) = C{a,b}(m
′ ∧ EI(m)),
EI(m′′) = C{b,c,d}(m
′′ ∧ EI(m′)),
IG(e2, a) = C{a,b}(EI(m
′′) ∧ b ◭ m′′).
This should be contrasted with the information Alma had after she sent the
email e1, which was EI(m
′).
5 Common knowledge
Our main objective is to clarify when a group of agents acquires common
knowledge of the formula expressing that an email was sent. This can be
done within our framework, which shows that it is appropriate for investi-
gating epistemic consequences of email exchanges.
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First, given a set of emails E and a group of agents A, we define
EA := {mB ∈ E | A ⊆ S(m) ∪R(m) or ∃j ∈ B : (A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {j})}.
When e ∈ EA we shall say that the email e is shared by the group A.
Note that when |A| ≥ 3, then e ∈ EA iff A ⊆ S(m) ∪R(m). When |A| = 2,
then e ∈ EA also when ∃j ∈ B : A = S(m) ∪ {j}, and when |A| = 1, then
e ∈ EA also when A = S(m) or ∃j ∈ B : A = {j}.
The following theorem summarizes our results. It provides a simple way
of testing whether a message or an email is a common knowledge of a group
of agents.
Theorem 8 (Main Theorem). Consider a legal state s = (E,  L) and a group
of agents A.
(i) s |= CAm iff there is m
′
B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → m is valid.
(ii) Suppose that |A| ≥ 3. Then s |= CAmB iff the following hold, where,
recall, Ag is the set of agents:
C1 Ag = S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B,
C2 for each i ∈ B there is m′B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → i ◭ m is valid,
C3 there is m′B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → m is valid.
Part (i) show that when we limit our attention to messages, then things
are as expected: a group of agents acquires common knowledge of a message
m iff they receive an email a part of which is m. If we limit our presenta-
tion to emails with the empty BCC sets we get as a direct corollary the
counterpart of this result for a simplified framework with messages only.
To understand part (ii) note that it states that s |= CAmB iff
• the email mB involves all agents,
• for every agent i that is on the BCC list of mB there is an email shared
by the group A that proves that i forwarded message m,
• there is an email shared by the group A that proves the existence of
the message m.
The first of the above three items is striking and shows that common knowl-
edge of an email is rare. C3 is just the condition used in part (i). So
an email mB such that A ⊆ S(m) ∪ R(m) does ensure that the group of
agents A acquires common knowledge of m. However, the group A can
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never know what was the set of the BCC recipients of mB unless it was the
set Ag \ (S(m) ∪R(m)) and there is a proof for this fact in the form of the
‘disclosing emails’ from all members of B.
Having in mind that the usual purpose of the BCC is just to inform its
recipients of a certain message (that they are supposed to ‘keep for them-
selves’), we can conclude that the presence of the BCC feature essentially
precludes the possibility that a group of agents can acquire common knowl-
edge of an email. Informally, the fact that the BCC feature creates ‘secret
information’ has as a consequence that common knowledge of an email is
only possible if this secret information is completely disclosed to the group
in question. Moreover, the message has to be sent to all agents.
Note that using the notion of the information gain introduced in the
previous section we can determine for each agent in a group A what he
learned from a message m or an email mB. In some circumstances, like
when m = s(i, l, G) and A ⊆ G∪{i}, this information gain can imply CAm.
However, the definition of EI(mB) implies that the information gain can
imply CAmB only in the obvious case when A = S(m).
Finally, the above result crucially depends on the fact that the notes are
uninterpreted. If we allowed emails that contain propositional formulas of
the language L from Section 3 augmented by the notes, then an agent could
communicate to a group A the fact that he sent an email mB (with a precise
set of the BCC recipients). Then mB would become a common knowledge
of the group A.
As an aside let us mention that there is a corresponding result for the
case when |A| < 3, as well. However, it involves a tedious case analysis
concerning the possible relations between A,S(m), R(m) and B, so we do
not present it here.
Example 9. We can use the above result to answer the second question
posed in Example 1. Let s be the state whose emails consist of the considered
four emails, so
e0 := m∅, where m := s(c, l, {a, d}),
e1 := m
′
∅, where m
′ := f(a,m, b),
e2 := m
′′
{a}, where m
′′ := f(b,m′, {c, d}), and
e3 := f(a,m
′′, {c, d}){b} .
Alma’s set of notes in s consists of l while the sets of notes of Bob, Clare
and Daniel are empty. Note that s is legal. We have then
s 6|= C{a,b,c,d}s(c, l, {a, d}).
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The reason is that we have
E{a,b,c,d} = ∅.
Indeed, for no m∗ ∈ {m,m′,m′′, f(a,m′′, {c, d})} we have
{a, b, c, d} ⊆ S(m∗) ∪R(m∗)
and for no m∗B ∈ {e0, e1, e2, e3} we have some j ∈ B such that
{a, b, c, d} ⊆ S(m∗) ∪ {j}.
So there are no messages that ensure common knowledge in the group
{a, b, c, d}. So even though there have been three forwards of the original
message, it is not common knowledge.
Clearly, if the original message s(c, l, {a, d}) is not common knowledge
then its forward f(a,m, b) is not common knowledge either. Another way
to derive this is directly from the Main Theorem. Namely, we have
s 6|= C{a,b,c,d}f(b,m
′, {c, d}){a} .
The reason is that condition C2 does not hold since no email shared by
{a, b, c, d} exists that proves that Alma received m′′. In contrast,
s |= C{a,c,d}f(b,m
′, {c, d}){a}
does hold, since the email e3 is shared by {a, c, d}. Further, if Alma had
used the forward f(a,m′′, {b, c, d})∅, then condition C2 would hold and we
could conclude for this modified state s′ that
s′ |= C{a,b,c,d}f(b,m
′, {c, d}){a} .
6 Proof of the Main Theorem
We establish first a number of auxiliary lemmas. We shall use a new strict
partial ordering on emails. We define
mB < m
′
B′ iff m 6= m
′ and m′ → m.
Note that by Lemma 1 m 6= m′ and m′ → m precisely if m′ is a forward,
or a forward of a forward, etc, of m. Then for two emails mB and m
′
B′ from
a legal state s that satisfies conditions L.1-L.3 w.r.t. an spo ≺, mB < m
′
B′
implies mB ≺ m
′
B′ on the account of condition L.1. However, the converse
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does not need to hold since mB ≺ m
′
B′ can hold on the account of L.2 or L.3.
Further, note that the <-maximal elements of E are precisely the emails in
E that are not forwarded.
Given a set of emails E and E′ ⊆ E we then define the downward
closure of E′ by
E′≤ := E
′ ∪ {e ∈ E | ∃e′ ∈ E′ : e < e′}.
The set of emails E on which the downward closure of E′ depends will always
be clear from the context.
Next, we introduce two operations on states. Assume a state (E,  L) and
an email mB ∈ E.
We define the state
s \mB := (E \ {mB},  L
′),
with
L′i :=
{
Li ∪ FI(m) if i ∈ R(m) ∪B
Li otherwise
Intuitively, s \mB is the result of removing the email mB from the state
s, followed by augmenting the sets of notes of its recipients in such a way
that they initially already had the notes they would have acquired from mB .
Note that s \mB is a legal state if mB is an <-maximal element of E.
Next, given C ⊆ B we define the state
s[mB 7→C ] := (E \ {mB} ∪ {mC},  L
′),
with
L′i :=
{
Li ∪ FI(m) if i ∈ B \ C
Li otherwise
Intuitively, s[mB 7→C ] is the result of shrinking the set of BCC recipients
of m from B to C, followed by an appropriate augmenting of the sets of
notes of the agents that no longer receive m.
Note that s[mB 7→C ] is a legal state if there is no forward of m by an
agent i ∈ B \C, i.e., no email of the form f(i, l.m,G)D exists in E such that
i ∈ B \ C.
We shall need the following lemma that clarifies the importance of the
set EA of emails.
Lemma 2. Consider a legal state s = (E,  L) and a group of agents A. Then
for some  L′ the state s′ := ((EA)≤,  L
′) is legal and s ∼A s
′.
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Proof. We prove that for all <-maximal emails mB ∈ E such that mB 6∈ EA
(so neither A ⊆ S(m) ∪ R(m) nor ∃i ∈ B : (A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i})) we have
s ∼A s \mB. Iterating this process we get the desired conclusion.
Suppose mB is a <-maximal email in E such that mB 6∈ EA. Take
some j ∈ A \ (S(m) ∪ R(m)). Suppose first j 6∈ B. Then s ∼j s \mB so
s ∼A s \mB.
Suppose now j ∈ B. Define
s1 := s[mB 7→{j}].
Then s1 is a legal state and s ∼j s1. Next, define
s2 := s[mB 7→∅].
Now take some k ∈ A\(S(m)∪{j}). Then s1 ∼k s2 ∼j s\mB so s ∼A s\mB .
Note that both s1 and s2 are legal states since mB is <-maximal.
Using the above lemma we now establish two auxiliary results concerning
common knowledge of the formula i ◭ m or of its negation.
Lemma 3.
(i) s |= CAi ◭ m iff ∃m
′
B ∈ EA : (m
′ → i ◭ m)
or (A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} and ∃mB ∈ EA : (i ∈ B)).
(ii) s |= CA¬i ◭ m iff s |= ¬ i ◭ m and (A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} or s |= CA¬m).
To illustrate various alternatives listed in (i) note that each of the fol-
lowing emails in E ensures that s |= C{j}i ◭ m, where in each case m is the
corresponding send message:
s(i, l, G){j}, f(k, q.s(i, l, G),H){j},
s(k, l, i){j}, f(i, q.s(k, l,G),H){j}, s(j, l, G){i}.
The first four of these emails imply s |= C{j}i ◭ m by the first clause of (i),
the last one by the second clause.
Proof. (i) (⇒) Suppose s |= CAi ◭ m. Take the legal state s
′ constructed
in Lemma 2. Then s ∼A s
′, so s′ |= i ◭ m.
Hence for some group B we have mB ∈ (EA)≤ and i ∈ S(m)∪R(m)∪B.
Three cases arise.
Case 1. i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m).
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Then m → i ◭ m. So if mB ∈ EA, then the claim holds. Otherwise
some email m′B′ ∈ EA exists such that mB < m
′
B′ . Consequently m
′ → m
and hence m′ → i ◭ m. So the claim holds as well.
Case 2. i 6∈ S(m) ∪R(m) and A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}.
Then i ∈ B since i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B. Then by the definition of EA,
mB ∈ EA so the claim holds.
Case 3. i 6∈ S(m) ∪R(m) and ¬(A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}).
If for some note l and groups G and C we have f(i, l.m,G)C ∈ (EA)≤,
then either f(i, l.m,G)C ∈ EA or for somem
′
B′ ∈ EA we have f(i, l.m,G)C <
m′B′ . In the former case we use the fact that the implication f(i, l.m,G)→
i ◭ m is valid. In the latter case m′ → f(i, l.m,G) and hence m′ → i ◭ m.
So in both cases the claim holds.
Otherwise let s′′ = s′[mB 7→B\{i}]. Note that s
′′ is a legal state because i
does not forward m in s′. Take some j ∈ A \ (S(m) ∪ {i}). Then s′ ∼j s
′′,
so s ∼A s
′′. Moreover, s′′ |= ¬i ◭ m, which yields a contradiction. So this
case cannot arise.
(⇐) The claim follows directly by the definition of semantics. We provide
a proof for one representative case. Suppose that for some email m′B ∈ EA
both A ⊆ S(m′) ∪ R(m′) and m′ → i ◭ m. Take some legal state s′ such
that s ∼A s
′. Then for some group B′ we have m′B′ ∈ Es′ . So s
′ |= m′ and
hence s′ |= i ◭ m. Consequently s |= CAi ◭ m.
(ii) Let s = (E,  L).
(⇒) Suppose s |= CA¬i ◭ m. Then s |= ¬i ◭ m. AssumeA 6⊆ S(m)∪{i}
and s 6|= CA¬m. Then there is some legal state s
′ = (E′,  L′) such that
s ∼A s
′ and s′ |= m. Then there is some group B such that mB ∈ E
′. Let
j ∈ A \ (S(m)∪{i}) and let s′′ = (E′ \{mB}∪{mB∪{i}},  L
′). Then s′ ∼j s
′′
so s ∼A s
′′. But s′′ |= i ◭ m which contradicts our assumption.
(⇐) Suppose that s |= ¬i ◭ m and either A ⊆ S(m)∪{i} or s |= CA¬m.
We first consider the case that A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}. Let s′ be any legal state
such that s ∼A s
′. Assume s′ |= i ◭ m. Then mB ∈ Es′ for some group
B such that i ∈ B. Since A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}, any legal state s′′ such that
s′ ∼A s
′′ contains an email mC ∈ Es′′ for some group C such that i ∈ C. So
s′′ |= i ◭ m. In particular, this holds for the state s, which contradicts our
assumption. So s′ |= ¬s(i, n,G) and hence s |= CA¬s(i, n,G).
Now we consider the case that s |= CA¬m. Let s
′ be such that s ∼A s
′.
Then s′ |= ¬m. Since i ◭ m → m is valid, we get s′ |= ¬i ◭ m. So
s |= CA¬i ◭ m.
We are now ready to prove the Main Theorem.
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of the Main Theorem. (i) (⇒) Suppose s |= CAm. Take the legal state s
′
constructed in Lemma 2. Then s ∼A s
′, so s′ |= m. So for some group B we
have mB ∈ (EA)≤. Hence either mB ∈ EA or some email m
′
B′ ∈ EA exists
such that mB < m
′
B′ . In both cases the claim holds.
(⇐) Suppose that for some email m′B ∈ EA we have m
′ → m. Take some
legal state s′ such that s ∼A s
′. Then by the form of EA and the definition
of semantics for some group B′ we have m′B′ ∈ Es′ . So s
′ |= m′ and hence
s′ |= m. Consequently s |= CAm.
(ii) By the definition of mB , the fact that the CA operator distributes
over the conjunction, part (i) of the Main Theorem and Lemma 3 we have
s |= CAmB iff C3-C6,
where
C4
∧
i∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B ((A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} and ∃B
′ : (mB′ ∈ EA and i ∈ B
′))
or ∃m′B′ ∈ EA : (m
′ → i ◭ m)),
C5
∧
i 6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B (A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} or s |= CA¬m),
C6 s |=
∧
i 6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B ¬i ◭ m.
(⇒) Suppose s |= CAmB. Then properties C3-C6 hold. But |A| ≥ 3
and s |= CAm imply that no conjunct of C5 holds. Hence property C1
holds.
Further, since |A| ≥ 3 the first disjunct of each conjunct in C4 does not
hold. So the second disjunct of each conjunct in C4 holds, which implies
property C2.
(⇐) Suppose properties C1-C3 hold. It suffices to establish properties
C4-C6.
For i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) we have m→ i ◭ m. So C2 implies property C4.
Further, since C1 holds, properties C5 and C6 hold vacuously.
7 Analysis of BCC
In our framework we built emails out of messages using the BCC feature. So
it is natural to analyze whether and in what sense the emails can be reduced
to messages without BCC recipients.
Given a send email s(i, l, G)B , where B = {j1, ..., jk}, we can simulate it
by the following sequence of messages:
s(i, l, G), f(i, s(i, l, G), j1), ..., f(i, s(i, l, G), jk ).
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Analogous simulation can be formed for the forward email f(i, l.m,G)B . At
first sight, it seems that this simulation has exactly the same epistemic effect
as the original email with the BCC recipients. In both states, each agent
j1, ..., jk receives separately a copy of the message and only the sender of
this message is aware of this. However, there are two subtle differences.
First of all, there is a syntactic difference between message that agents
j1, ..., jk receive in the original case and in the simulation. In the original
case they receive exactly the messagem, and in the simulation they receive a
forward of it. This also means that if they reply to or forward the message,
there is a syntactic difference in this reply or forward. This difference is
purely syntactic and does not essentially influence the knowledge of the
agents, even though it clearly influences the truth value of the formula j ◭ m
which is true for j ∈ {j1, ..., jk} in the original case but not in the simulation.
The second difference is more fundamental. If agents j1, ..., jk are BCC
recipients of m and they do not send a reply to or a forward of m, then each
of them can be sure that no other agent but the sender of m knows he was
a BCC recipient. Indeed, in our framework there is no message the sender
of m could send to another agent, that expresses that agents j1, ..., jk were
the BCC recipients of m.
In the case of the simulation however, these recipients do not receive a
BCC but a forward. Since these forwards may have additional BCC recip-
ients of which agents j1, ..., jk are unaware, they cannot be sure that the
other agents do not know that they received a forward of the message. Fur-
thermore, the sender of m could also forward the forward he sent to j1, ..., jk
without informing them about it, thus also revealing their knowledge of m.
A concrete example that shows this difference is the following.
Example 10. Let
Es = {s(1, l, 2){3}}.
Then s |= K3¬K2K3s(1, l, 2), that is, agent 3 is sure that agent 2 does
not know about his knowledge of the message s(1, l, 2). A simulation of
this email without a BCC recipient would result in the state t with (we
abbreviate here each email m∅ to m)
Et = {s(1, l, 2), f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3)}.
Now consider a state t′ with:
Et′ = {s(1, l, 2), f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3), f(1, f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3), 2)}.
Clearly t ∼3 t
′ and t′ |= K2K3s(1, l, 2). This shows that t 6|= K3¬K2K3s(1, l, 2).
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This argument can be made more general as follows. Below, in the
context of a state we identify each message m with the email m∅. Then we
have the following result.
Theorem 11. Take a legal state s = (E,  L), an email mB ∈ E and an agent
j ∈ B such that E does not contain a forward of m by j or to j. Then for
every set of messages M such that (M,  L) is a legal state we have for every
agent k 6∈ S(m) ∪ {j}
s |= Kjm ∧Kj¬KkKjm,
while
(M,  L) 6|= Kjm ∧Kj¬KkKjm.
Proof. Agent j is a BCC recipient of m in s, so by the definition of the
semantics s |= Kjm. We will first show that s |= Kj¬KkKjm. Take some
state t such that s ∼j t. Then by the definition of the semantics there is some
group C such that mC ∈ Et and j ∈ C. Suppose that m is a send email,
say m = s(i, l, G). For the case that m is a forward email the reasoning is
analogous. Let u be the state like t, but with
Eu = Et\{s(i, l, G)C} ∪ {s(i, l, G)C\{j}, s(i, l, j)}.
Note that we implicitly assume that no full version of s(i, l, j) is already
present in Et. If there were such a full version, we could do the same
construction without adding s(i, l, j) to Et.
Since there are no forwards of m by j or to j in E, and s ∼j t, there
are no forwards of m by j or to j in Et. This shows that u is a legal state
and that there are no forwards of m to j in Eu so u 6|= Kjm. Clearly, for
every k 6∈ S(m) ∪ {j} we have t ∼k u. So t 6|= KkKjm, which shows that
s |= Kj¬KkKjm.
Take now any set of messages M such that (M,  L) is legal and suppose
(M,  L) |= Kjm. Then by the Main Theorem there is some message m
′
in which agent j was involved that implies that message m was sent. By
the requirements on the legal states we know that there is such a message
m′ of which agent j was a recipient, and not the sender, since agents can
only send information they initially knew or received through some earlier
message. Since there are no BCC recipients in M , we conclude that agent j
is a regular recipient of m′ that he received from some other agent and that
m′ → m is valid.
Define the set of messages M ′ by
M ′ :=M ∪ {f(S(m′),m′, k)}.
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Note that (M ′,  L) is a legal state, and (M ′,  L) |= Kkm
′. Since j is a
regular recipient of m′, m′ → Kjm
′ is valid and since m′ → m is also
valid this implies that (M ′,  L) |= KkKjm. Also, since j is not involved in
f(S(m′),m′, k), (M,  L) ∼j (M
′,  L). This shows that (M,  L) 6|= Kj¬KkKjm.
In view of our assumption that (M,  L) |= Kjm we conclude that (M,  L) 6|=
Kjm ∧Kj¬KkKjm.
In this theorem we assume that for the BCC recipient j of the messagem
there are no forwards of m to j or by j. The theorem shows that under these
assumptions, s and (M,L) can be distinguished by an epistemic formula
concerning the message m. We will now show that these assumptions are
necessary.
Example 12. Take a legal state s = (E,  L) with
E = {s(1, l, 2){3}, f(2, s(1, l, 2), 3)}
and
M = {s(1, l, 2), f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3), f(2, s(1, l, 2), 3)}.
We can see that (M,  L) is a perfect BCC-free simulation of s: for every
formula ϕ that holds in s, if we replace the occurrences of 3 ◭ s(1, l, 2) in
ϕ by f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3) then the result holds in (M,  L). The reason that we
can find such a set M is that in E there is a forward of s(1, l, 2) to agent
3. This reveals the ‘secret’ that agent 3 knows about s(1, l, 2) and then the
fact that agent 3 was a BCC recipient of s(1, l, 2) is no longer relevant.
Example 13. A similar example shows the importance of the assumption
that there are no forwards by a BCC recipient. Take a legal state s = (E,  L)
with
E = {s(1, l, 2){3}, f(3, s(1, l, 2), 2)}
and
M = {s(1, l, 2), f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3), f(3, f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3), 2)}.
Again, for every formula ϕ that holds in s, if we replace the occurrences of
3 ◭ s(1, l, 2) in ϕ by f(1, s(1, l, 2), 3) then the result holds in (M,  L). Now
the reason is that agent 3 informed agent 2 that he was a BCC recipient of
s(1, l, 2) in s by sending a forward of this message, so again the fact that
agent 3 knows s(1, l, 2) is not a secret anymore.
It is interesting to note that the impossibility of simulating BCC by
means of messages is in fact caused by our choice of uninterpreted notes as
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the basic content of the messages. If our framework allowed one to send
messages containing more complex information, for example a formula of
the form j ◭ m, the sender of m could have informed other agents who were
the BCC recipients. Then in Example 10 we could consider a state s′ with
Es′ = {s(1, n, 2){3}, s(1, 3 ◭ s(1, n, 2), 2)}.
By appropriately extending our semantics we would have then s ∼3 s
′ and
s′ |= K2K3s(1, n, 2), and hence s 6|= K3¬K2K3s(1, n, 2), so the difference
between the above two states s and t would then disappear.
Similarly, if we allowed epistemic formulas as contents of the messages,
then in the above example agent 1 could use the message s(1,K3s(1, n, 2), 2)
to inform agent 2 that he BCC’ed agent 3 when sending the message s(1, n, 2).
We leave an analysis of such extensions of our framework and the role of
BCC in these extended settings as future work.
Finally, let us mention another feature of our syntax that cannot be
faithfully simulated by simpler means —that of appending a note to a for-
warded message. Suppose that we allow instead only a ‘simple’ forward
f(i,m,G) and simulate the current forward f(i, l.m,G) by a send and a
simple forward, i.e., by the sequence s(i, l, G), f(i,m,G). Then the fact that
the note l was ‘coupled’ with m can in some circumstances provide a piece
of additional information that becomes lost during the simulation. Here is
a concrete example. We do not use BCC here, so each email m{∅} is written
as m.
Example 14. Suppose that l1, l2 ∈ L1 and l1, l2 6∈ Li for i 6= 1. Let
m := s(1, l, 1) and
Es := {m, f(1, l2.m, 2)}.
Then for all i we have s |= K1(Kim → Kil2), that is, agent 1 knows that
every agent who knows the message m also knows the note l2.
A simulation of these two messages with a simple forward would yield
the state t with
Et := {m, s(1, l2, 2), f(1,m, 2)}.
Now consider a state t′ with:
Et′ := {m, s(1, l2, 2), f(1,m, 2), f(2,m, 3)}.
Clearly t ∼1 t
′ and t′ |= K3m ∧ ¬K3l2. This shows that t 6|= K1(K3m →
K3l2).
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Note that this example exploits the fact that in our framework the agents
can forward the notes that are ‘buried’ within the received emails (thanks
to the references to l ∈ FI(m) in conditions L.2 or L.3 in Subsection 2.3),
whereas they can only forward the messages they received. That is, they
cannot forward messages that are ‘buried’ within the emais they received.
This natural restriction is satisfied by the email systems.
8 Email exchanges
Finally, we return to the issue of the synchronicity of the email commu-
nication mentioned in Section 3. To this end we introduce an operational
semantics that also allows us to provide a characterization of the notion of
a legal state in terms of email exchanges. In this setting emails are sent in
a nondeterministic order, each time respecting the restrictions imposed by
the legality conditions L.1 – L.3 of Subsection 2.3.
This operational semantics is defined in the style of [15], though with
some important differences concerning the notions of a program state and
the atomic transitions. LetM be the set of all messages (so not emails). By
a mailbox we mean a function σ : Ag→ P(M); σ(i) is then the mailbox of
agent i. If for all i we have σ0(i) = ∅, then we call σ0 the empty mailbox .
A configuration is a construct of the form < s, σ >, where s is a legal
state and σ is a mailbox.
Atomic transitions between configurations are of the form
< s, σ >→< s′, σ′ >,
where ∪˙ denotes disjoint union and
• s := (E ∪˙ {mB},  L),
• s′ := (E,  L),
• for j ∈ Ag
σ′(j) :=
{
σ(j) ∪ {m} if j ∈ R(m) ∪ S(m) ∪B
σ(j) otherwise
We say that the above transition processes the email mB. This takes
place subject to the following conditions depending on the form of m, where
 L = (L1, . . . , Ln):
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• send m = s(i, l, G).
We stipulate then that l ∈ Li or for some m
′ ∈ σ(i) we have l ∈
FI(m′). In the second case of the second alternative we say below
that m depends on m′.
• forward m = f(i, l.m′, G).
We stipulate then that m′ ∈ σ(i), and l ∈ Li or for some m
′′ ∈ σ(i)
we have l ∈ FI(m′′).
In the case of the first alternative we say below that m depends on
m′ and in the case of the second alternative that m depends on m′
and m′′.
Given a legal state s an email exchange starting in s is a maximal
sequence of transitions starting in the configuration < s, σ0 >, where σ0
is the empty mailbox. An email exchange properly terminates if its last
configuration is of the form < s′, τ >, where s′ = (∅,  L). The way the atomic
transitions are defined clarifies that the communication is synchronous.
Note that messages are never deleted from the mailboxes. Further, ob-
serve that in the above atomic transitions we augment the mailboxes of the
recipients of mB (including the BCC recipients) by m and not by mB . So
the recipients of mB only ‘see’ the message m in their mailboxes. Likewise,
we augment the mailbox of the sender by the message m and not by mB .
As a result when in an email exchange a sender forwards his own email, the
BCC recipients of the original email are not shown in the forwarded email.
This is consistent with the discussion of the emails given in Subsection 2.2.
Observe that from the form of a message m in the mailbox σ(i) we can
infer whether agent i received it by means of a BCC. Namely, this is the
case iff i 6∈ R(m) ∪ S(m). (Recall that by assumption the sets of regular
recipients and BCC recipients of an email are disjoint.)
The following result then clarifies the concept of a legal state.
Theorem 15. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) s is a legal state,
(ii) an email exchange starting in s properly terminates,
(iii) all email exchanges starting in s properly terminate.
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) states that the property of a legal
state amounts to the possibility of processing all the emails in an orderly
(and synchronous) fashion.
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Proof. Suppose s = (E,  L).
(i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose that s is a legal state. So conditions L.1-L.3 are
satisfied with respect to an spo ≺. Extend ≺ to a linear ordering ≺l on
E. (Such an extension exists on the account of the result of [18].) By
the definition of the atomic transitions we can process the emails in E in
the order determined by ≺l. The resulting sequence of transitions forms a
properly terminating email exchange starting in s.
(ii)⇒ (iii). Let ξ be a properly terminating email exchange starting in
s and ξ′ another email exchange starting in s. Let mB be the first email
processed in ξ that is not processed in ξ′. The final mailbox of ξ′ contains the
message(s) on which m depends on, since their full versions were processed
in ξ before mB and hence were also processed in ξ
′. So mB can be processed
in the final mailbox of ξ′, i.e., ξ′ is not a maximal sequence. This is a
contradiction.
(iii)⇒ (ii). Obvious.
(ii) ⇒ (i). Take a properly terminating email exchange ξ starting in s.
Take the following spo ≺ on the emails of E: e1 ≺ e2 iff e1 is processed in ξ
before e2. By the definition of the atomic transitions conditions L.1-L.3 are
satisfied w.r.t. ≺, so s is legal.
Intuitively, the equivalence between the first two conditions means that
the legality of a state is equivalent to the condition that it is possible to
execute its emails in a ‘coherent’ way. Each terminating exchange entails
a strict partial (in fact linear) ordering w.r.t. which conditions L.1-L.3 are
satisfied.
9 Conclusions and future work
Email is by now one of the most common forms of group communication.
This motivates the study here presented. The language we introduced al-
lowed us to discuss various fine points of email communication, notably for-
warding and the use of BCC. The epistemic semantics we proposed aimed
at clarifying the knowledge-theoretic consequences of this form of commu-
nication. Our presentation focused on the issues of epistemic content of the
emails and common knowledge.
This framework also leads to natural questions concerning axiomatiza-
tion of the introduced language and the decidability of its semantics. Cur-
rently we work on
• a sound and complete axiomatization of the epistemic language L of
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Section 3; at this stage we have such an axiomatization for the non-
epistemic formulas,
• the problem of decidability of the truth definition given in Section 3;
at this stage we have a decidability result for positive formulas and for
formulas without nested epistemic operators,
• a comparison of the proposed semantics with the one based on se-
quences (’histories’) of emails rather than partially ordered sets of
emails.
In our framework, as explained in Sections 3 and 8, communication is
synchronous. This is of course a simplifying assumption and should be
viewed as a first step in analyzing epistemic reasoning in email exchanges.
We plan to extend our results to the more general framework of [3], by
assuming for each agent a known time bound by which he reads his emails.
When moving to asynchronous communication we should be aware of the
already mentioned result of [7] that common knowledge of nontrivial facts
cannot be achieved. In view of this negative result various weaker forms
of common knowledge were proposed in the literature. In particular [10]
introduced the concept of a timestamped common knowledge and proposed
a communication primitive that achieves it. In turn, [13] introduced the
notion of a concurrent common knowledge defined using Lamport’s causality
notion. These variants could be studied for the case of email exchanges with
asynchronous communication, taking the present framework as a departure
point.
Communication by email suggests other forms of knowledge. Recently
[16, Chapter 6] considered potential knowledge and definitive knowledge in
the context of email exchanges. When a message is sent to an agent, that
agent acquires potential knowledge of it. Only when he forwards the message
he acquires definitive knowledge of the message. The idea is that when a
message is sent to an agent one cannot be sure that he read it. Only when he
forwards it one can be certain that he did read it. The considered framework
is an adaptation of the one presented here. The common knowledge is not
considered but a decision procedure is presented for all considered epistemic
formulas.
Another extension worthwhile to study is one in which the agents com-
municate richer basic statements than just notes. We already indicated in
Section 7 that sending messages containing a formula i ◭ m increases the
expressiveness of the messages from the epistemic point of view. One could
also consider in our framework sending epistemic formulas, a feature recently
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studied in [17] in a setting with a finite number of messages and the BCC
feature absent.
Finally, even though this study was limited to the epistemic aspects of
email exchanges, it is natural to suggest here some desired features of emails.
One is the possibility of forwarding a message in a provably intact form. This
form of forward, used here, is present in the VM email system integrated
into the emacs editor; in VM forward results in passing the message as an
attachment that cannot be changed. Another, more pragmatic one and not
considered here, is disabling the reply-all feature for the BCC recipients
so that none of them can by mistake reveal that he was a BCC recipient.
Yet another one is a feature that would simulate signing of a reception of
a registered letter — opening such a ‘registered email’ would automatically
trigger an acknowledgment. Such an acknowledgment would allow one to
achieve in a simple way the above mentioned definitive knowledge.
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